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INDIVIDUALITY AND 
SHAREABILITY:
AN EXPLORATION TO THE 
NISHIDA KITARO’S ACCOUNT 
OF THE ABSOLUTE NEGATION-
QUA-AFFIRMATION
The internal justification of the individuality leads us to a 
tendency of a solipsistic self. This justification lacks a 
consideration to include external agent or the others as a part 
of recognition of the individuality of the self. The analytical 
approach argues that the reference of the external agent in 
utterance realizes the individuality of the speaking subject. 
This viewpoint of the significance of the external agent 
should be equipped with another approach. Nishida's 
account of the principle of the absolute negation qua 
affirmation brings forth the argument that the individuality 
of the self realizes the nature of interconnectivity with the 
others. This interconnectivity then marks the shareability of 
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individuals. This article yearns for a social system that allows 
the safeguarding of the individual and at once the upgrading 
of dialogical interactions between individuals for the benefit 
of ingenious construction of the world of reality.
internal justification solipsistic self individuality shareability 
absolute negation qua affirmation shareability of the self
continuity of discontinuity public place dialogical interactions
Introduction
t is almost taken for granted that individuality is considered a Ifoundation of modern ontology. Individuality I consider here 
reveals a conception of the self as the unified and irreducible subject. 
Following Descartes, Kant since the era of Enlightenment, Modern 
Philosophy had already shared the significance of individuality to cultural, 
social, legal and political systems. Laws of privacy, the declaration of 
human rights, democracy, and market economy are some examples of how 
the modern system turns a belief in individuality into the system of 
individuality. 
The conviction of individuality, however, is not without a tendency to 
put individuality in the extreme position. This tendency attempts to 
consider the individuality as a closed representation of the self. This 
extreme position believes that only the internal justification of truth and 
existence through the thinking capacity asserts the existence of the self. This 
claim could be regarded as the worldview of solipsistic self. The emergence 
of the solipsistic self as the complete realization of the selfhood then 
emerges as a problem not only on the level of individual relationships but 
also on that of social interactions.
Regarding this problem, an appreciation of individuality can be 
considered a viewpoint offered as an alternative approach to an 
interpretation of the self. In this article I refer to Nishida Kitaro (1870 – 
1945), a Japanese philosopher of Kyoto School of philosophy, whose Zen 
Buddhism viewpoint analyzes and appreciates the Western account of 
individuality. This paper will develop his argument of the principle of 
1
absolute negation qua affirmation  which implies the idea of shareability as 
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an alternative approach of being. By shareability I mean that the self-
determined selfhood does not only appear as an 'open system' but also as an 
interactive relationship with the other. In this sense the self is unique due to 
its nature of sharing. 
Therefore, I construct this paper in two parts. The first part explains a 
question of individuality interpreted from the Cartesian account of the 
thinking subject, or 'I think'. In this exploration this paper highlights the 
argument that the thinking self is clearly bounded or individual lead to the 
problem of solipsistic self, or the individual whose assertion of existence 
relies on its own judgment or belief and rejects a relation with the other. 
Meanwhile, if one only insists on the individuality of the self, then one will 
find out a paradox that the existence thinking subject includes necessarily 
relationship with the Absolute Other in order to determine its existence. 
This highlight leads us to the second part which develops Nishida 
Kitaro's formulation of the mutual determination of individual based on 
the principle of 'the absolute negation-qua-affirmation'. His 
epistemological formulation considers the paradox of the self as the nature 
of shareability of the self. This argument of shareability does not wipe out 
the individuality of the self. Both are complement to each other. 
The Problem of Solipsistic Self
Many philosophers and philosophical mainstreams have analyzed and 
debated over the topic of individuality of selfhood, especially since Decartes 
and the modern philosophy. One of these mainstreams is the analytical 
approach of the 'I' as the speaking subject (who is also thinking). This idea 
implies in the proposition of 'cogito' which reveals the argument of the 
'speaking subject as the self-determined subject. The capacity of speaking 
indicates a representation of thinking subject in order to know its existence. 
'To know' in this sense also embodies a cognition that 'I am'. This 
proposition asserts the certainty that 'I exist'. This also indicates a causal 
relation between thinking and existence of the self. One could recognize 
this causal relation as to guarantee the self-determination of subject. Once a 
thinking subject obtains her self determination by means of an utterance 
then the subject recognizes the self as the singular and bounded entity. This 
rational justification is significant due to it also guarantees the unity of the 
self as the individual. 
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At the time the individuality is obtained the subject also acquires the 
precondition of sameness. It means that the self stays unchangeable 
regardless flows of time and a position in space. The self has its permanent 
side which is independent from external influences like temporal and 
spatial movement. In other words, the Cartesian proposition 'I am, I exist’  
implies that such an utterance implies a continuation that the speaking 
subject is the same with the self-determination of subject. 
To explain this, take an example of this proposition 'I am a student'. This 
logical proposition contains not only a speaking subject 'I' as it is indicated 
in the word 'I', but also a predicate '(am) a student'. One can analyze the 
predicate in two forms: a physical representation of the predicate and the 
3
mental one . Both are associated with the speaking subject. The first form of 
predicate embodies a physical appearance of subject which according to 
Cartesian category attributes to change in temporal and spatial context. 
Meanwhile, the second form of predicate points out a mental 
attribution of 'being a student'. This consciousness characterizes an 
identification of the speaking subject, 'I', to itself. Here the identification 
4
means that the subject and itself are 'the very same (thing) person” . Moreover, 
such identification also justifies that the subject experiences an 
individualization of her identity. Thus, the mental attribution in this 
utterance guarantees the individualization of a thinking subject thence 
such individualization establishes the permanent identity of such subject. 
One can suggest that the consciousness of individualization makes the 
subject the individual. 'Being a student' does not only attribute one's 
permanent status but also the individualization of the speaker as the student. 
The reasonable justification of true person as the student signifies the 
awareness that the speaking subject is distinguished from the others 
students as the individual.
This semantic analysis of a speech act clearly implies that as being the 
individual the speaking subject occupies a specific status which is 
impenetrable by an intervention of others. This occupation of a specific 
status posits the self-determination of the subject 'I”. One would have a vain 
existence unless one asserted this self-determination. In this sense the self-
determined subject is also a required condition to individuality of the 
subject 'I'. In Ricoeur's analysis this self-determination of the subject 
implies the “condition of the neutralization of the self”. This neutralization of 
the self necessarily asserts that “the possession of the body by someone or by each 
5
one poses the enigma of an untransferable property…”
2
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Now the individualization of the self by means of semantic analysis of 
the speech act of speaking subject 'I' conceives the true self-determined of 
the subject. This rational justification implies a belief that the individuality 
is determined by the subject alone. In this sense this image of the 
individuality of subject implies a solipsistic view of the self. 
Nevertheless if one perceives this conception from the other side of the 
coin, the image will be different. One can refer to Nietzsche's satirical 
review of the rational justification of the individuality of the self. In his 
essay “On Truth and Lies in a nonmoral sense” (1873), Nietzsche argues for 
the idea that “The intellect as a means of preserving the individuals, develops its 
principal strengths in dissimulation, for this is the means by which weaker, less 
6
robust individuals preserves themselves,…”.  Nietzsche considers that this 
'dissimulation' contains “… deception, flattery, lying and cheating, talking behind 
the backs of others, keeping up appearances, living in borrowed splendor, donning 
7
masks, the shroud of convention, playacting before others and before oneself ….”  
This satirical critique implies that the intellectual justification only hides 
the weak traits of the self and it simply appears as a self-defense mechanism. 
This is the reason one could concurs with Nietzsche's argument that the 
merely internal justification of the individual is simply “illusion and dream 
images”. 
This satirical conception is part of the critical questions about the 
image of solipsistic self. Ricoeur, for instance, has indicated that the 
underlying reason of the speaking subject 'I' to assert its self-determination 
'borrows' or 'relies on' the authority of the absolute Self or God for the sake 
of the certainty of this self-determination. The absolute Self is the ratio 
essendi and ordo essendi for the cogito so that the speaking subject has a reason 
or ratio cognoscendi and ordo cognoscendi for explaining the individuality of 
8
itself.
The reliance on the external agent which embodies the absoluteness 
reveals that individuality is nothing unless the speaking subject involves in 
an ontological interaction. The self gains the individuality not simply by 
means of asserting the internal sameness between the speaking subject 'I' 
and the consciousness of being the individual. The individuality is 
guaranteed then by the correlation of the external absolute agent. In other 
words, the acknowledgment of individuality is not derived from internal 
reference as if it were as such only by referring to the transcendental 
conception of the Self. 
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This is the reason that Ricoeur also argues for the reliability of the self to 
the other in order to justify its individuality. His semantic analysis indicates 
that the speaking subject ascribes its utterance to 'someone' that is, oneself 
or the Self. This external agent realizes the ratio essendi for the capability of 
cognoscendi of the speaking subject. Ricoeur continues with the argument 
that “there is no self alone at the start; …. I cannot speak meaningfully of my thoughts 
9
unless I am able at the same time to ascribe them potentially to someone else”.  It 
means that the ascription of my thought to someone or something, or 'The 
transcendental Self', makes myself as an individual comprehensible. This 
interconnectivity between the subject 'I' and the other(s) also contributes to 
the self-determination of the self. 
The semantic analysis and interpretation of the speaking subject 'I' lead 
us to think of the nature of shareability of the self besides that of 
individuality. Ricoeur suggests this when he interprets the ascription of the 
speaking subject 'I' to someone else. He argues that one should regard the 
consciousness of both an experience of subject through her utterance and 
an observation to someone's speech act as two complementary references. 
In this sense, the speaking 'I” reciprocally correlates with 'you' as the other 
10
self.
This idea of correlating the self-reflexivity and the idea of otherness is 
challenging insofar as one could provides a thinking foundation on which 
one can explore the interconnectivity of subjects. This exploration of 
thinking foundation, according to Ricoeur should take into account the 
opposition of 'I' against 'you' and simultaneously equip it with another 
approach which transform the opposition of 'I – you' into a shareable 
11
interaction.  
For this purpose, I now am ready to refer to Nishida's argument which 
posits a thinking principle which is named 'the absolute negation qua 
affirmation'. This thinking principle takes into account the self 
determination of the individual and the nature of shareability of I and you. 
An Exploration of the Shareability of the Self
How can one understand that the self-determination of individual is 
acquired not only through the internal justification of the self as the 
individual? This question leads us to Nishida's interpretation, which applies 
his logical principle for the phenomena of the speaking subject 'I' and the 
12
others, Thou, you, or things. His dynamic-circular approach  starts with 
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the experiential realm of these subjects whose presences on that field are 
never regarded as the solipsistic persons respectively, but as the 
interconnecting agents. He underlines that this experiential subject 'I' does 
not detach from interconnectivity with the 'rational subject 'I'. This is the 
reason that Nishida considers a condition of temporal and spatial 
movement as the indispensable categories of experiential realm. 
Nishida follows the arguments that our apprehension of this 
experiential realm conceives of a categorization of the temporal and spatial 
conditions, or the social and historical world. The temporal condition 
comprises of the self of past, present and future. The spatial conditions are 
the external space, the target or objective world of our understanding, and 
the internal one, the subjective inclination to think or to know an intended 
object. The Western philosophers consider these conditions, respectively or 
collectively as categories of thinking. These categories logically appear in 
opposite or contradictory pairs.
Nevertheless, Nishida argues against the argument which puts these 
categories in opposition or contradiction. He considers these binary pairs 
cannot be separated as if one could conclude its existence apart from the 
other. The determination of the self, either as subject or object, either 
internal or external, necessarily includes the interconnectivity with the 
other. 
Nishida considers this interconnectivity as the 'continuity of 
13
discontinuity’ . This metaphor signifies an essential interaction between 
ontological entities whatever their respective positions. Moreover, he views 
that the individualization of the selves is comprehensible on the virtual 
field or place of or medium, or 'basho' in Zen Buddhism's term, which 
emerges as intersections of these categories of experiential realm. This 
'place' or 'field' is more like virtual than physical appearance of 'space'. In 
this virtual place of experiential interaction, one can indicate an 
interconnectivity between entities such as subject-objects, I-Thou, even 
14
time-space . On this virtual place, too, the selves emerge as the individuals 
respectively.
How can this 'virtual place' of intersection between experiential 
categories explain the self-determination of subject through the 
interconnectivity one with the others, I – Thou? Nishida's account of the 
temporal movement, for example, explains that the individuality of the self 
is derived from the interaction of the self of yesterday and that of today. The 
'I' of yesterday is defined by that of today and vice versa. Besides the identity 
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of subject in the past time, Zen Buddhism's conception of time also takes 
into account the 'today' time which embodies a presentation of the self here 
and now. This presentation is infinite and it is metaphorically depicted as a 
circular extension of time according to Zen Buddhist worldview. In this 
context, the self remains in the infinite present as the individual too. 
The linear movement from the past to the present uncovers the change 
or the progression of the self while the circular present reveals the 
permanent or the continuity of the self. The merely changing and 
progressive self does not depict the self determination of subject and so does 
the permanent one. Nishida considers that within the virtual 'place' (basho) 
the intersection of the past and present the subjects are actualized. 
Along with the temporal context, the existence of the self concludes 
within the intersection of the external space or the realm of objects. As the 
external side of spatial context, this world is neither determined by a 
subjective intervention, nor does it appear as the sole source to define the 
existence of subject. Rather, the world of object becomes the target of 
subject's apprehension of reality or the teleological direction of our 
15
knowing and thinking.
Besides the external space, the second type of spatial context is implied 
in Nishida's argument of 'desire' and 'intuition' as the part of our 
inclination towards the intended object. In this sense, one can consider 
them as the internal space whose function is to define the world as it is 
16
intended (noema) . The internal space emerges from intentional actions of 
the subject (noesis) in response to the world of object. 
The explanation of the intersection of temporal and spatial categories 
of experiential realm leads us to Nishida's logical principle whose function 
is to yield the comprehension of the nature of interconnectivity embodied 
by the subject. For this purpose, one should not skip Nishida's conception 
of the relation of 'I - Thou'. The former metaphorically signify the thinking 
or knowing subject (noesis), while the latter metaphorically represents the 
external agent whose presence necessarily interacts with the former. This 
external agent can represent the 'I' of yesterday, intended objects of thinking 
17
(noema), social or historical worlds, the universal or simply 'the thing’ . In 
other words, the relation I – Thou metaphorically signifies the intersection 
of subjective consciousness with the intended entities of understanding 
through interconnectivity. 
The 'I' does not merely communicate with 'Thou' in this sense. The 
interaction indicates that 'I' is the determination of the existence of Thou 
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and vice versa. This mutual determination asserts the existence of the agents 
as the individual. In this sense, the subject 'I' negates the other in order to 
affirm its existence. The merely presentation of 'I' is not sufficient to prove 
that the 'I' exists. It has to negate itself so that it can be regarded as the self 
from the apprehension of the other or 'Thou'. The first negation only 
signifies a distinction of 'I' against 'Thou', yet this distinction does not 
confirm that 'I' necessarily exists. The mere existence of I is meaningless or 
empty. It becomes meaningful then when the second negation occurs. The 
other apprehension of the other is not merely a viewpoint. Rather 'Thou' in 
this sense necessarily determines that 'I' exists. This is why Nishida says 'the 
18
individual is only determined only relative to other individuals’ . This 
double negation also applies for 'Thou' as the other(s). The double negation 
according to Nishida indicates the absolute negation. This absolute 
negation does not eliminate the 'I' and 'Thou' and retain one of them. 
Rather, this absolute negation affirms that both entities exist. This way of 
thinking then becomes the principle of 'the absolute negation-qua-
affirmation'. This principle transforms the individuality into 'the relative' 
19
(in Nishida's term), or in my term, the shareable . 
To the extent of the relativity or shareability of the individual one 
should refer to Nishida's account of action and life otherwise the principle 
of absolute negation-qua-affirmation is considered merely as a tautological 
20
exchange ('or dependant causation’ ) in our mind. Nishida views the 
mutual determination of the individuals more as an action than a 
contemplation or thinking on the virtual medium of intersection or 'basho'. 
According to Nishida, an intention of subject towards the object or the 
other(s) constitutes an involvement of the others or 'a submersion of a 
21
subject in the object’ . This mutual determination is the reason Nishida 
22
asserts, “For if not, there is no objective world relative to individual” . 
Thus, the action in Nishida's account is not a derivation of thinking as it is 
thought in the Western philosophy. Action is thinking which in itself realizes 
the desire to apprehend an object.
One also should consider the principle of absolute negation qua 
affirmation neither in dualistic conception of existence, nor in the 
dialectical thinking. The dualistic or dialectical thought employs the 
contest of the particular (thesis vis-à-vis antithesis) in order to deductively 
yield the unconditioned agent or the universal. Nishida does not follow this 
thinking mode. He argues that the universal is merely an ultimate 
representation of an individual in itself. In this sense, the deductive 
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inference from the dialectical thinking of I – Thou only produces another 
unresolved opposition or contradiction between individuals or the 
universal against the particulars. Moreover, according to Nishida, one can 
find out a contradiction between universals as if there were the universal of 
23
universals.  
This is why one should go beyond the opposition or contradiction of 'I 
– Thou' in order to explain the mutual determination of the self through 
the principle of absolute negation qua affirmation. It is indispensable to 
consider a third feature besides the two others: 'I – Thou'. There should be a 
'mediating activity' in dialectical thought which avoids the elimination of 
24
one entity and keeps the other, since 'there can be no wholly singular life’ . 
Moreover, this mediating activity allows an act of creativity which preserves 
and develops the existence of 'I – Thou'. 
This third feature in Nishida's term is pertinent to the 'public place/field' 
(basho), out of which 'the mutual determination of two things', I – Thou is 
actualized.  This is the 'virtual place of intersection' about which I have 
explored above.  Thus, the third feature as the virtual place of intersection 
should be regarded as the mediating activity on which the individuals gain 
25
its self determination.   
The existence of the third feature in this sense echoes a characteristic in 
26
Zen Buddhist worldview . This worldview depicts three elements of 
existence as the triadic structure. The third element in Nishida's account 
becomes the 'virtual place'of intersection which is also pertinent to 
nothingness. It is the third element that engenders a determination of 'I' as 
'I' and 'Thou' as 'Thou'. This place from its depth realizes the 
interconnectivity between 'I – Thou' so that these two features experience 
their meaningful existence. Regarding this intermediary nature in the 
experiential realm, one should not regard this determining 'place' as an 
abstraction from the dialectical thinking. Instead this determining place 
realizes the context of social and history, which both of them respectively or 
together appears as the virtual intersection of individuals, or that of time 
and space. In this case the opposition or contradiction between 'I and 
Thou', time and space remains. They do not appear in order to eliminate 
each other; rather, within in this virtual intersection they serve as a 
preservation of each other, and actualize the creative extension out of the 
27
relationship in form of a 'new creation’ . 
This is the significance of the idea of shareability between individuals. 
The nature of shareability realizes that there is a true existence out there. 
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That external existence can articulates their respective 'minds', 'voices', 
'interests' or any means of expressions. A dialogical interaction between the 
self and the external existences realizes the experience that individuals are 
naturally interconnected(-ing).
Concluding: Individuality and Shareability
So far I have presented my argument that the insistence of individuality 
based on merely internal justification leads us to the problem of solipsistic 
self. The problem arises when the assertion of personal existence only relies 
on the internal justification to thinking capability. This way of assertion 
turns into a belief that a justification of truth only comes out of the internal 
justification. In other world, the solipsistic self put the individuality of 
subject impenetrable by external knowledge. Moreover it disregards any 
external references as part of this internal belief of truth. This conception 
then entails rejection of the others. 
Meanwhile, the analytic and semantic approaches clearly indicate the 
external reference of the other (as someone or something) in the realization 
of individuality in utterance. These approaches still retain the authority of 
subject in order to confirm its individuality against any external agent of 
28
utterance since Aristotelian philosophical analysis.
One can refer to another approach which allows the others as 
something true and indispensable. This is what Nishida tries to prove in 
front of his readers who are from the west and who are educated in the 
framework of Western philosophical view. Nishida offers an argument that 
justification of individuality indispensably includes the others through the 
interconnectivity between subject – object, or 'I – Thou'. This individuality 
implies the nature of shareability of the self in such intermediary action. 
Moreover the interconnectivity itself expresses an active involvement of the 
self in socio-historical context. On this domain, the virtual 'place' of 
intersection between selves determines not only the individuality of the self 
but also confirms the dialogical interaction. In this sense, this interaction 
does not only echoes moral intention of individual towards other or merely 
capacity of communication. This also realizes that the existence of oneself is 
the inseparable part of the others and vice versa.  
Regarding this nature of individuality and shareability of the self one 
can start with an exploration of an adequate social system. Such a system 
allows the preservation of the individual and simultaneously the 
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enhancement of dialogical interactions between individuals for the sake of 
the creative construction of the world of reality.
See Nishida 1970, 1987; cf. Dilworth 1987: the introduction chapter of Nishida 
1987; 1979:249-267. 
See Descartes' 'Second Meditation' in 1996:17, cf. Ricoeur 1992:6-7.
Cf. Ricoeur 1992:33f.
Cf. Ricoeur 1992:36.
Both quotations see Ricoeur 1992:37.
Nietzsche 2010:20.
Idem
Ricoeur 1992:8.
Ricoeur 1992:38. Due to the purpose of this topic, I suggest readers to refer more to the 
semantic approach of the problem of cogito and the hermeneutics of the self in this 
Ricoeur's book.
Ricoeur 1992:39. “… we have to acquire simultaneously the idea of reflexivity and the idea of 
otherness, in order to pass from a weak correlation between someone and anyone else, which is too 
easily assumable, to a strong correlation between belonging the self, in the sense of mine and 
belonging to another, in the sense of yours”
Idem Ricoeur writes “In this sense, if a purely referential approach in which the person is 
treated as a basic particular is to be completed by another approach, it cannot be thereby 
abolished but will be preserved in this very surpassing.”
If one reads Nishida's works especially the publication to which I refer, one will find 
out the repetition of some 'formulas' or ideas, some in somewhat consistent 
formulations, and in modified ones. I would like to call his style as a dynamic-circular 
expression rather than a tautological mode or merely a circular style. His expanding 
mode of writing attempts to delineate the interconnectivity of binary conception 
which is usually depicted in opposition or contradiction between two different 
concepts, as one is familiar with the modern (Western) philosophy. A commentary of 
his style as a circular style is indicated in Dilworth 1979:261
Nishida 1970:43.
Nishida 1987; cf. Dilworth 1987:15-16: Nishida develops this idea by positing 'the 
place of nothingness' which is considered as teleological place where the 
intersection of subject-object gains the determination of meaning existence. Cf. 
also Dilworth 1979:253-254, 259. 
Nishida 1970:60. In my opinion it is comparable with the phenomenology's term 
of 'noema' or 'an object as it is meant', yet it is different from Kant's 'Das Ding an 
sich' or 'noumenon'.
Nishida 1970:61.
See Nishida 1970:48, 57; I also develop the identification of Thou from the 
commentary of Nishida by Dilworth 1979:258.
Endnotes:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
58
MELINTAS 27.1.2011
18
.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Bibliography:
Nishida 1970:49
Nishida 1970:44; in another works 1987:69 Nishida writes “As I have often written, the 
absolute is not merely non-relative. For it contains absolute negation within itself. Therefore the 
relative which stands in relation to the absolute is not merely part of the absolute or a lesser 
version it. If it were, the absolute would indeed be non-relative but it would no longer be the 
absolute, either. A true absolute exists in that it returns to itself in the form of relative.”
This term is coined by Dilworth 1979:265.
Cf. Dilworth 1979:265 “… the self as a free person paradoxically finds itself through 
submerging in itself in objectivity, as in the case of aesthetic creation.”
Nishida 1970:52.
Nishida 1970:48.
Nishida 1970:53 
The topic of the determining 'place' of the interconnecting I – Thou is spread in 
Nishida's work. For example see in 1979:55, 57, 64, 67, 84, etc.
One can read the chapter 3 of the second part of Nishida book (1970) for further 
explanation of the characteristics of worldview. Cf. my exploration of some Asian 
traditions of wisdom. These wisdoms depict a constellation of triadic structure of 
existence which metaphorically put 'I – Thou – the Universe' as complementary to 
each other in Djunatan 2010; 2011:chapts. 3 & 6.
Nishida 1970:57, 64, 66, 69, 79 cf. Dilworth 1979:264-265.
See Nishida's conception of the worldview of the Western Culture in 1970 part II 
chapter 3; 1987; Dilworth 1979:260f.
Descartes, René, 1996, Meditation on First Philosophy, transl. & ed. by. John 
Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dilworth, David A. 1999, “The Concrete World of Action in Nishida's 
Later Thought” in Japanese Phenomenology, Phenomenology as the Trans-
cultural Philosophical Approach, 1979 eds. By Yoshihiro Nitta & Hirotaka 
Tatematsu, Dordrecth, Boston, London: D. Riedel Publishing 
Company, p. 249 – 270.
Dilworth, David A. 1987, “Introduction: Nishida Critique of the Religious 
Consciousness” in Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings, Nothingness and the 
Religious Worldview, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 1 – 45. 
Djunatan, Stephanus, 2010, “Sunda – The affirmative life: the Mythological 
worldview of the Contemplative site Nagara Padang, West Java, 
Indonesia” in New Perspectives on Myth, proceedings of the Second Annual 
Conference of the International Association for Comparative Mythology, 
Ravenstein (The Netherlands) 19 – 21 August 2008, eds. by Wim. M.J. van 
Binsbergen & Eric Venbrux, Haarlem/Nijmegen: PIP –TraCS – No.5, p. 
59
Stefanus Djunatan: Individuality and Shareability
375 – 408.
Djunatan Stephanus, 2011, The Principle of Affirmation, an ontological and 
epistemological ground of interculturality, Rotterdam: EUR, unpublished 
Dissertation.
Kitaro, Nishida, 1970, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, the World of Action 
and the Dialectical World, transl. David A. Dilworth, Tokyo: Sophia 
University.
Kitaro Nishida, 1987, Last Writings, Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Nietzsche, Frederich, 2010, On Truth and Untruth, selected writings, transl. & 
ed. Taylor Carman, NY: Harper Perennial Modern Thought.
Ricoeur, Paul, 1992, Oneself as Another, transl. Kathleen Blamey, Chicago & 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
60
MELINTAS 27.1.2011
